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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                        No. CR 22-175-DSF
                                        GOVERNMENT'S SENTENCING POSITION;
13
              Plaintiff,
                                        DECLARATIONS; EXHIBITS
14
                   v.
                                        Hearing Date: November 21, 2022
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    DAVID JOSEPH BUNEVACZ,
                                        Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.
                                        Location:
                                                       Courtroom of the
16
              Defendant.
                                                       Hon. Dale S. Fischer
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         Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
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    of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
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    California and Assistant United States Attorney Alexander Schwab,
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    hereby files its sentencing position.
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         This sentencing position is based upon the attached memorandum
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    of points and authorities, the attached declarations of Alexander B.
24
    Schwab and Special Agent Ryan Asato, the accompanying exhibits (being
25
    filed separately under seal), the Presentence Investigation Report
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    ("PSR"), the government's previously filed objections to the PSR, the
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files and records in this case, and such further evidence and argument as the Court may permit. Dated: November 7, 2022 Respectfully submitted, E. MARTIN ESTRADA United States Attorney SCOTT M. GARRINGER Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division /s/ ALEXANDER B. SCHWAB Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, defendant maintained the intricate illusion that he was a cannabis-industry mogul. Exploiting his victims' knowledge that decriminalization had turned cannabis into a booming industry, defendant used an array of shell companies, bank accounts, and forgeries to raise more than \$45 million in investments from victims who believed their money would be used to finance successful cannabis vape pen companies. It was a scam.

As he continued to gaslight his suffering victims, defendant dissipated tens of millions of dollars maintaining his family's quasi-celebrity lifestyle. One victim writes how, as he and his family "were struggling to figure out how we would pay for basic necessities like a roof over our heads and putting food on the table" as a result of defendant's crimes, he "could see on social media that [defendant] was driving fancy cars, flying private planes, and traveling the world with his family with not a care in the world."

(Exh. A, at 2). Defendant continued to spin his lies and defraud new victims even after being placed on probation for committing state securities offenses.

For his crimes, defendant now faces sentencing for securities and wire fraud. Defendant has requested that the Court impose a below-guideline sentence of 87 months' imprisonment, but, as explained in further detail in this sentencing position, such a sentence is insufficient to achieve the goals of sentencing. In consideration of the many both the aggravating factors in this case, but also and defendant's prompt acceptance of responsibility, the government requests that defendant be sentenced to the low end of his

guideline range as calculated by the Court, which, by the government's estimate, should result in a 168-month term of imprisonment, a three-year period of supervised release, restitution of \$35,267,851.98, and a \$200 special assessment.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Portraying himself as someone who was "very successful in the cannabis industry" and speaking "with convincing authority on the changes and trends occurring around legalization" (Exh. A, at 10), defendant scammed well over a hundred investors out of more than \$35 million in a scheme that goes back to 2010. Some of defendant's victims were sophisticated investors who were snared in defendant's web of convincing forgeries and false indicia of real business activity. (See, e.g., id. at 6, 8). Others were friends and acquaintances who trusted defendant implicitly and viewed his conspicuous spending was proof of his business acumen. (See, e.g., id. at 9-12). All were taken in by defendant's lies that victims' funds would be used as investments in various businesses specializing in cannabis vape pen products. (PSR ¶¶ 16-18, at 5-6).

To win his victims' trust, defendant maintained a complex network of shell companies and bank accounts, which he controlled either directly or through nominees acting at his direction. (PSR ¶¶ 22, 24 at 6, 7). Many mimicked the names of real businesses operating in the cannabis space, such as Grenco Science and SaveurVape. (Id. ¶ 23, at 6). Using these shell companies, defendant generated false invoices, purchase orders, bank statements — any document necessary to keep the scam going. (Id. at 6-7). One investor found online information suggesting defendant had been the subject of a major lawsuit; defendant placated his concerns by

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providing him a fraudulent version of the settlement agreement in that case bearing the forged signatures of G.H. and his attorney and making it appear that defendant had won the lawsuit. (PSR \P 21, at 6). In fact, it was defendant who had agreed to pay G.H. to settle the case, which arose after defendant had defrauded G.H., destroying the latter's business and forcing him into bankruptcy. (Exh. A, at 1-2).

In the midst of defendant's fraud scheme, he was charged in Los Angeles Superior Court in 2012 with felony securities crimes. (PSR \P 75, at 15). Nearly five years later, he was finally sentenced to probation for his offenses and ordered to pay a total of \$273,000 in restitution to two victims. (Id.). Defendant was also given a sentence of 360 days in jail, which was permanently stayed because defendant fulfilled his restitution obligation "by securing additional investments from new victims . . . so that he would not be subjected to a custodial sentence." (Id. at 16). During his time on probation, defendant continued to defraud new investors. He also failed to abide by his probationary conditions; on May 3, 2019, for example, defendant "failed to appear in court in relation to a possible probation violation. Probation was then revoked, and a bench warrant was issued." (Id. at 15). On July 18, 2019, defendant "appeared before the court and admitted to a probation violation" and "[p]robation was reinstated under the same terms and conditions." (Id.). Defendant concealed his criminal prosecution and conviction from investors.

Throughout the scheme, defendant used his victims' money to finance his opulent lifestyle and that of his family. For example, defendant withdrew over \$8 million at casinos, with gambling losses

of an estimated \$3,755,050 at the Wynn between just January 2018 and June 2019. (Compl. \P 33(a)(i), at 23-24). He spent close to a million dollars on jewelry. (Id. \P 33(b), at 24). He used more than \$1.3 million on horses and related expenses. (Compl. \P 33(c), at 24). He dropped over \$200,000 on an event planner for a lavish sweet sixteen birthday party for his daughter. (Id. \P 33(d), at 25). And well over ten million dollars went to paying off various credit card bills. (Id. \P 33(h), at 25).

All in all, defendant raised \$45,227,266.98 from investors and caused his victims net losses of \$35,267,851.98. (Asato Decl. \P 13, at 5).

III. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The government submits that the following sentencing guidelines apply, which are consistent with the PSR's calculation except as otherwise noted in the government's previously filed objections (CR 37):

TOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL:	34	
Acceptance of Responsibility	-3	USSG § 3E1.1
Obstruction of Justice	+2	USSG § 3C1.1
Sophisticated Means	+2	USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)
Substantial Financial Hardship to 5 or More Victims	+4	USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B)
Loss > \$25 million	+22	USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L)
Base Offense Level	7	USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1)

Without any departure to defendant's criminal history, his guideline range is 151 to 188 months' imprisonment. However, if, as the government argues for in its objections to the PSR, the Court applies

an upward departure in defendant's criminal history to Category II, the result is a quideline range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment.

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A. Substantial Financial Hardship to Five or More Victims

Defendant challenges the PSR's application of a four-level adjustment to his offense level based on the offense resulting in substantial financial hardship to five or more victims under USSG \$ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).

The PSR sets forth a convincing basis for applying the enhancement:

In the present case, the government has provided information detailing the loss that some of the victims suffered as a result of Bunevacz's actions. Specifically, G.H. was forced to file for bankruptcy, had no money left in their savings, and lost their home; C.C. lost a majority of their savings and their plans of retirement were deferred; I.H. 1 lost \$800,000, which constituted a majority of their savings that they had saved over the last 10 years; J.H. lost \$300,000 that they intended to use for retirement and had to change their lifestyle in hopes of still being able to retire on time; A.C. lost money that they intended to use for retirement and is now in a position where they are now planning to defer their retirement; and other named victims loss substantial amounts of money that impacted their financial position and future plans.

The victim impact letter of C.W. also details how his father's co-investment in defendant's scam has forced him to put off his retirement (Exh. A, at 8) -- one of the examples the Sentencing Guidelines specifically references as constituting substantial financial hardship. USSG § 2B1.1, comment. (n.4(F)(iv)).

In any event, while the number of identified victims suffering such hardship demonstrates the adjustment applies, all that is necessary is a "reasonable estimate" where it is "sufficient for the

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ This appears to be a typographical error in reference to victim I.C. (PSR \P 19, at 6).

the sentencing court reasonably to infer a pattern." <u>United States</u>

<u>v. George</u>, 949 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that more than a hundred victims suffered at defendant's hands, <u>see generally</u> Exh. B, the Court has ample basis to conclude, as the Probation Office did, that defendant caused substantial financial hardship to at least five of his victims.

IV. ARGUMENT

Defendant requests that the Court impose an 87-month sentence — a substantial downward variance from 168 months, which is the low end as the government calculates it. The government continues to believe that the low end of defendant's guideline range strikes the appropriate balance between aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. But, as explained below in further detail, a sentence below defendant's guideline range is inadequate to achieve the goals of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

A. While a Guideline Sentence Is Necessary To Satisfy the Statutory Sentencing Goals, a Low-End Sentence Is Sufficient To Achieve Those Goals

Section 3553(a) prescribes that a sentence must be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of sentencing. As explained above, a sentence below defendant's guideline range would fail to comply with those purposes. But given the significant guideline range defendant faces, coupled with his swift acceptance of responsibility, a sentence at the low end of that range is appropriate.

Defendant was arrested on April 5, 2022, with his current counsel appointed to represent him at the beginning of June.

Defendant entered his plea agreement on July 1. For a case of this

temporal scope, complexity, and seriousness, defendant's acceptance of responsibility was unusually quick, reducing the burden on the Court, the government, and defendant's victims. While the nature of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility is prohibited as a basis for a downward departure, USSG § 5K2.0(d)(2), it does inform where, within defendant's guideline range, he should be sentenced. That is particularly the case here where even a low-end sentence involves a substantial term of imprisonment. And, as defendant correctly notes, the aggravating factors of defendant's offense conduct are already reflected in defendant's offense level. (CR 38, at 10). The Court should therefore sentence defendant to the low end of his guideline range.

In arguing for a below-guideline sentence, defendant also contends that he would face the same guideline range even if the loss amount in the case were substantially higher. While the government disagrees that this is a basis for a below-guideline sentence, it provides yet further support for sentencing defendant at the low end of his applicable range.

B. A Low-End Term of Imprisonment Is Necessary To Account for the Egregiousness of Defendant's Crimes and To Justly Punish Him

In some respects, the Sentencing Guidelines aptly quantify the massive scale of the damage defendant wrought: more than \$35 million in losses to well over a hundred investors, with many suffering serious financial hardship, like the loss of savings or delays to retirement. Yet the seriousness of defendant's offense cannot be captured in mere dollars and cents.

Defendant, in requesting a below-guideline sentence, argues in his sentencing position that the guideline range he faces resembles

- one typically reserved for violent criminals. That comparison is an apt one; the wounds defendant has inflicted are every bit as real.

 As the victim impact statements demonstrate, the sense of violation, the assault on personal dignity, and the lasting trauma defendant has caused are very much reminiscent of the harm typically associated with violent crimes. And, with well over a hundred victims, defendant caused these harms at a scale rarely seen:
- 1. **G.H.** Victim G.H. describes how defendant "used his charm to earn my trust and lured me into a web of lies and forged documents that caused me to lose a very successful business that I had built from the ground up over the course of 10 years." (Exh. A, at 1).

 G.H. goes on to explain how defendant's fraud "cost me my business, my income, my customers, my friends, and almost, my family," and how defendant's "insatiable greed" led to "foreclosure on our home," spending "our entire life savings fighting him in court," and, ultimately, being "forced to file for bankruptcy. For years afterward, I struggled personally to find myself and to trust myself again." (Id. at 2). G.H. also notes that he "got a chance to see Bunevacz face-to-face a few times during our legal battle. He had no remorse for anything he caused." (Id.).
- 2. **G.B.** Victim G.B. explains how defendant, in addition to the direct financial losses he caused him, "totally ruined my business network" and "professional credibility." (Exh. A, at 4). More importantly, he describes how defendant "dramatically ruined my health, though he consciously knew I was recovering from a metastatic cancer which hit me 5 years before I met him." (Id.). As G.B. explains, defendant "told me numerous times I was a brother to him and he would never forget what I was doing for him," with G.B. now

- finding that he is "absolutely disgusted by [defendant] -- the worst human being I've ever crossed!" ($\underline{\text{Id.}}$). G.B. is now facing a relapse in his cancer which he worries may prove fatal.
- 3. **S.S.** In his letter, Victim S.S. explains how defendant's "deliberate, large scale" fraud resulted in losses of \$3.5 million to his investment firm and another \$1 million he provided personally after taking out a \$1 million loan based on his home's line of credit. (Exh. A, at 5). S.S., a sophisticated investor, was taken in by defendant's lies, including "purported audited financial statements," "a legal opinion from their company lawyer," and "purchase order details with a vape pen distributor." (Id.). S.S. describes the "considerable stress on my marriage caused by me recommending to my wife that we make this loan to David Bunevacz" and the "significant reputational harm" that has limited his company's ability to raise funding. (Id. at 6-7).
- 4. C.W. Victim C.W., who invested alongside his parents and a family friend, describes defendant's fraud as "highly elaborate and particularly evil." (Exh. A, at 8). C.W. notes that defendant's crime has especially harmed his father, who "came to this country with \$50 in his pocket," by forcing him "to push off his retirement as an anesthesiologist in order to recoup the savings he lost." (Id.).
- 5. I.C. Victim I.C. remarks of defendant that "[i]t still shocks me whenever I recall how easily he would lie to me to convince me to give him my life savings." (Exh. A, at 9). He notes that he has "aged prematurely many years from this ordeal" and "will need to work longer and harder for the rest of my life to partially repair the financial ruin." (Id.). I.C. is "not interested in an apology"

because he believes defendant "is not remorseful and would continue to do what he did if he was free." (Id.).

6. W.S. & L.S. Victims W.S. and L.S. invested in defendant's scam after meeting him through their daughters' involvement in the equestrian world. They quickly noted defendant's flashy lifestyle, including "the house they rented from Kylie Jenner and [defendant's wife's] 50th birthday party at Nobu. Their ostentatious wealth -- he drove a Lamborghini Urus SUV and Jessica drove a Bentley -- seemed mysterious but went unquestioned." (Exh. A, at 10). Now that defendant has revealed his true self to them, W.S. and L.S. caution that he "has a deep malevolent power of persuasion that he will use to try to wriggle out of any responsibility. Once he's 'out' he will return to what he knows best, stealing money from friends. Please do not fall for his manipulations." (Exh. A, at 12).

To be sure, a low-end sentence in this case constitutes a substantial term of imprisonment, such that a higher sentence would be "greater than necessary[] to comply with the purposes" of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But neither is defendant an appropriate candidate for a below-guideline sentence. Defendant did not concoct his scheme to keep a foundering business afloat or deal with an unforeseen expense like a family member's medical bills. Rather, he casually frittered away his victims' money propping up his opulent lifestyle and that of his family, which also assisted him in constructing the persona of a successful businessman whom future victims could trust. Defendant spent millions of dollars of other people's money on his gambling habit, his expensive jewelry and handbag purchases, and even his horses. Even as much of the world was quarantining at home amidst a global pandemic, defendant was

giving interviews describing the privileged existence he and his family led with his victims' money living in their Calabasas mansion, which he rented for \$18,000 per month (PSR \P 102, at 20): "We wake up late . . . We all workout. We are blessed to have a gym at home" and "we end our day watching TV as a family, all of us will be at the family room or [home] theater while eating popcorn." (PSR \P 69, at 12-13).

C. The Massive Profits Defendant Reaped and His Criminal Behavior While on Probation Demonstrate the Need for a Guideline Sentence to Afford Adequate Deterrence and Protect Society from Defendant

The scale, length, and sophistication of defendant's scheme warrant a guideline sentence to provide just punishment. But they also demonstrate the need for a sentence sufficient to protect the public from defendant's further crimes and afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).

As the victim impact statement of G.H. reveals, defendant has been living a life of fraud for more than a decade. His crime is no aberration or series of mistakes borne of circumstances, but rather an insight into his selfishness and willingness to hurt others to make a buck. The risk of recidivism is all the greater where, as here, we have insight into how defendant has responded in the past when made to answer for his crimes: after pleading guilty to state securities offenses, defendant bamboozled the sentencing court into suspending his time in jail to afford him the opportunity to make restitution; defendant paid that restitution by defrauding additional victims; he continued to operate his multimillion-dollar investment scam while serving probation; and he even avoided punishment after violating the terms of his probation. (PSR ¶ 75, at 15-16). Less

than two weeks after being sentenced in state court, defendant even spent \$14,215 Rolex submariner watch on March 28, 2017. \P 33(b), at 24). Given this history, only a guideline sentence of imprisonment will protect the public and provide the direct deterrence necessary to dissuade defendant from continuing to offend. More generally, defendant's scheme, which caused his victims losses of more than \$35 million, requires a quideline sentence to deter others who might believe such a staggering sum of money would be worth the chance of being caught. Economic crimes like defendant's are quintessentially deterrable so long as they are met with significant term of imprisonment. "Because economic and fraudbased crimes are 'more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, ' these crimes are 'prime candidate[s] for general deterrence." United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 721, 724 (2005)). In fact, Congress, in drafting § 3553, confirmed that this common-sense principle was one of the driving forces for including deterrence among the goals of sentencing. See S. Rep. No. 98-255, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259 ("To deter others from committing the offense . . . is particularly important in the area of white collar crime."). Congress was, in fact, expressly concerned with the fact that "[m]ajor white collar criminals often are sentenced to . . . little

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or no imprisonment," which the offenders disregard as "a cost of doing business." ${\rm Id.}^2$

The sad reality is that, even with a guarantee of eventual apprehension, many individuals would gladly accept the prospect of a few years in prison in exchange for the life of luxury defendant and his family enjoyed for the past decade. And, of course, there is no guarantee of apprehension at all, particularly in the case of complex fraud schemes like this one, which involved shell companies, myriad bank accounts, convincing forgeries, and the ability to plausibly claim to investors that what was, in truth, a massive scam was merely a business deal gone wrong. To afford adequate deterrence, the sentence in this case must account both for the profitability of large-scale investment fraud schemes and the difficulty in uncovering and prosecuting them. In this case, defendant's sentencing guidelines appropriately measure these interests, and a low-end sentence of 168 months would take adequate consideration of the need for general deterrence.

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² Defendant argues that the Sentencing Guidelines for fraud offenses should be given less credence because they are not the product of empirical analysis of the types of sentences federal judges had imposed. This is true, but only because of Congress's conclusion that white-collar criminals had been systemically undersentenced vis-à-vis other offenders. Whereas most federal fraud defendants received probationary sentences before the Sentencing Guidelines were instituted, "the sentencing-reform movement focused on meting out equal sentences for equally bad crimes." Bibas, supra, at 723. Reformists specifically feared that these previously light sentences for fraud defendants "indulg[ed] unconscious racial and class stereotypes by going easy on defendants who remind judges of themselves or with whom judges can identify." Id. at 724. Rather than departing from some platonic ideal of the optimal sentence, Congress's directives to the Sentencing Commission to stiffen penalties for white-collar crimes reflect that body's conclusion that fraud defendants merited tougher sentences than many had received.

V. RESTITUTION AND VICTIMS

The government submits that the appropriate restitution figure in this case is \$35,267,851.98. Exhibit B to this sentencing position, which the government files under seal to protect the privacy interests of the victims, sets forth the individualized breakdown by victim, with the declaration of Special Agent Ryan Asato providing the basis for those calculations.

Based on information previously available to the government at the time of defendant's guilty pleas, the Probation Office calculates \$35,222,932 in actual losses. (PSR \P 32, at 8). To his credit, defendant does not appear to contest this restitution figure, which provides an additional basis for sentencing him at the low end of his applicable guideline range.

Exhibit A to this sentencing position, which the government is filing separately under seal, comprises the victim impact letters it has received to date. To the extent additional victims submit letters, the government will file those with the Court as well. At least one victim has indicated a desire to address the Court in person at the time of sentencing.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that this Court reject defendant's request for a downward variance and sentence him to the low end of his guideline range (which the government currently believes to be 168 months' imprisonment), a three-year period of supervised release, restitution of \$35,267,851.98, and a \$200 special assessment. Should the Court determine at sentencing that a different guideline range applies, the government will modify its recommendation accordingly.